This posed a limitation with utf8 PROTOCTL NICKCHARS=... and
potentially PROTOCTL SERVERS=... if having more than 32 servers.
The limitation has now been removed (buffer length = 512)
This is the "non breaking space" outside UTF8 and thus was previously
blacklisted. Keeping it blacklisted even if it appears in UTF8 is not
really an option as it means some UTF8 characters can never be used,
like the letter "nun" in Hebrew, and likely others.
module but at least the code can be updated on the fly (or replaced
with some other secondary alternative module in the future).
src/charsys.c -> src/modules/charsys.c
This also means everyone needs to load the modules/charsys module.
See https://www.unrealircd.org/docs/Nick_Character_Sets
Example: set { allowed-nickchars { latin-utf8; }; };
Important remarks:
* All your servers must be on UnrealIRCd 4.0.17 (or later)
* Most(?) services do not support this, so users using UTF8 nicknames
won't be able to register at NickServ.
* In set::allowed-nickchars you must either choose an utf8 language
or a non-utf8 character set. You cannot combine the two.
* You also cannot combine multiple scripts/alphabets, such as:
latin, greek, cyrillic and hebrew. You must choose one.
* If you are already using set::allowed-nickchars on your network
(eg: 'latin1') then be careful when migrating (to eg: 'latin-utf8'):
* Your clients may still assume non-UTF8
* If users registered nicks with accents or other special characters
at NickServ then they may not be able to access their account
after the migration to UTF8.
[!] Work in progress [!]
"SSL_accept(): Internal OpenSSL error or protocol error: tls_process_client_hello: unsupported protocol"
rather than just
"SSL_accept(): Internal OpenSSL error or protocol error"
Perhaps it can be shortened in a later version if this is acceptable.
This can help with tracing server linking errors, and/or
if using the junk snomask (MODE nick +s +j).
Naturally this is only available if the extbans/timedban module is
loaded and you should do so on all your servers on the same network
if you want to avoid confusion/desynchs.
These are bans that are automatically removed by the server.
The duration is in minutes and the mask can be any ban mask.
=> Note that you need to load the extbans/timedban module!
Some examples:
* A 5 minute ban on a host:
+b ~t:5:*!*@host
* A 5 minute quiet ban on a host (unable to speak):
+b ~t:5:~q:*!*@host
* An invite exception for 1440m/24hrs
+I ~t:1440:*!*@host
* A temporary exempt ban for a services account
+e ~t:1440:~a:Account
* Allows someone to speak through +m for the next 24hrs:
+e ~t:1440:~m:moderated:*!*@host
* And any other crazy ideas you can come up with...
For example if you had:
set { restrict-extendedbans "a"; };
Then this would be rejected:
MODE #chan +b ~a:Account
However, you could still set:
MODE #chan +b ~q:~a:Account
Now this is properly rejected as well.
Fix case where conv_param() returns NULL (ban rejected)
causing is_ok() function not to be called so the user
never sees the error. We now try to call the is_ok after
conv_param returns NULL.
So not really an API change, more like a fix.
the WEBIRC gateway gives us some assurance that the
client<->webirc gateway connection is also secure (eg: https).
This is the regular WEBIRC format:
WEBIRC password gateway hostname ip
This indicates a secure client connection (NEW):
WEBIRC password gateway hostname ip :secure
Naturally, WEBIRC gateways MUST NOT send the "secure" option if
the client is using http or some other insecure protocol.
https://github.com/ircv3/ircv3-ideas/issues/12
In 3.2.x we didn't fix these bugs since servers are trusted and
should send correct commands. In 4.0.x we changed this so we would
fix them when we come across such issues at normal priority (not
consider them security issues). I now took it a step further and
actively checked/looked for these issues and a bunch of them were
found. Almost all are NULL pointer dereferences, with some exceptions.
* S2S: MODE: check conv_param return value (NULL ptr crash)
* S2S: MODE: floodprot: More checks (NULL ptr crash)
* S2S: MODE: OOB write of NULL (write NULL past last element in an array)
* S2S: NICK: old compat fixes (NULL ptr crash)
* S2S: PROTOCTL: Check for double SID=
* S2S: SERVER: require at least 3 parameters (NULL ptr crash)
* S2S: SJOIN: require at least 3 parameters (NULL ptr crash)
* S2S: SJOIN: Fix OOB read (read 1 byte past buffer)
* S2S: TKL: validate set_at and expire_at (NULL ptr crash)
* S2S: TKL: require at least 9 parameters for spamf, not 8 (NULL ptr crash)
* S2S: TKL: ignore invalid spamfilter matching type (remove abort() call)
* S2S: TOPIC: querying for topic is not permitted (NULL ptr crash)
* S2S: UID: require 12 parameters (NULL ptr crash)
* S2S: WATCH: this is not a server command (NULL ptr crash)
* Fix OOB read (1 byte beyond string) for timevals. This was reachable
from config code, TKL (S2S) and /*LINE (Oper). In practice no crash.
* MODE: make code less confusing (effectively no change)
* TRACE: remove strange output in case of 0 lines of output
* Fix unimportant memory leak on boot (#4713, reported by dg)
* Fix small memory leak upon 'DNS i' (oper only command)
* Always work on a copy in clean_ban_mask(). This fixes a bug that could
result in a strlcpy(buf, buf, sizeof(buf)). So, overlapping strings,
which is undefined behavior.
* API change for HOOKTYPE_PRE_INVITE:
(aClient *sptr, aClient *target, aChannel *chptr, int *override)
Modules must now send the error message instead of only returning
HOOK_DENY. Also check for operoverride and set *override=1.
This so modules can send their own error messages instead of the
default message being sent ("channel is +V" - which is not true).
Reported by Gottem (#5023).
set::handshake-delay of 2 seconds by default. This will allow (most)
DNSBL checking to be finished before the user comes online, while
still allowing a smooth user experience.
If your DNS(BL) is slow then you could raise this setting slightly.
Bram Matthys