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mirror of https://github.com/weechat/weechat.git synced 2026-06-12 14:14:48 +02:00

irc: limit size of data received from the server to prevent memory exhaustion

A malicious or compromised IRC server could send data with no end-of-line
(or a flood of "005" messages), making WeeChat accumulate it in a buffer
that grew without limit, until all memory was exhausted.

The unterminated received message and the accumulated "005" (ISUPPORT)
data are now bounded by IRC_SERVER_RECV_MSG_MAX_LENGTH and
IRC_SERVER_ISUPPORT_MAX_LENGTH: extra data is ignored once the limit is
reached.
This commit is contained in:
Sébastien Helleu
2026-06-01 21:53:03 +02:00
parent 07871f123f
commit 1211510ded
6 changed files with 117 additions and 9 deletions
+1
View File
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
- core: fix option weechat.look.color_real_white not applied when color is "white" on 16+ colors terminals ([#1742](https://github.com/weechat/weechat/issues/1742))
- irc: fix tag in message with list of names when joining a channel
- fset: remove error displayed in core buffer when clicking with the mouse below the last option displayed
- irc: limit size of data received from the server to prevent memory exhaustion
- relay: limit size of decompressed websocket frame with permessage-deflate to prevent memory exhaustion ([GHSA-v2v4-45wm-5cr3](https://github.com/weechat/weechat/security/advisories/GHSA-v2v4-45wm-5cr3))
- relay: fix timing attack on password authentication ([GHSA-vhv8-g2r9-cwcc](https://github.com/weechat/weechat/security/advisories/GHSA-vhv8-g2r9-cwcc))
- api, relay: fix timing attack on TOTP validation ([GHSA-vhv8-g2r9-cwcc](https://github.com/weechat/weechat/security/advisories/GHSA-vhv8-g2r9-cwcc))
+9
View File
@@ -4164,6 +4164,14 @@ IRC_PROTOCOL_CALLBACK(005)
if (ctxt->server->isupport)
{
length_isupport = strlen (ctxt->server->isupport);
/*
* limit the size of the accumulated ISUPPORT data: once the
* maximum is reached, ignore the extra data (protection against a
* server flooding "005" messages, which would consume all the
* memory)
*/
if (length_isupport + 1 + length < IRC_SERVER_ISUPPORT_MAX_LENGTH)
{
isupport2 = realloc (ctxt->server->isupport,
length_isupport + /* existing */
1 + /* space */
@@ -4176,6 +4184,7 @@ IRC_PROTOCOL_CALLBACK(005)
strcat (ctxt->server->isupport, str_info);
}
}
}
else
{
ctxt->server->isupport = strdup (str_info);
+8
View File
@@ -3409,6 +3409,14 @@ irc_server_msgq_add_unterminated (struct t_irc_server *server,
if (server->unterminated_message)
{
/*
* limit the size of the unterminated message: once the maximum is
* reached, ignore the extra data (protection against a server sending
* a very long line without end-of-line, which would consume all the
* memory)
*/
if (strlen (server->unterminated_message) >= IRC_SERVER_RECV_MSG_MAX_LENGTH)
return;
unterminated_message2 =
realloc (server->unterminated_message,
(strlen (server->unterminated_message) +
+9
View File
@@ -144,6 +144,15 @@ enum t_irc_server_option
#define IRC_SERVER_MULTILINE_DEFAULT_MAX_BYTES 4096
#define IRC_SERVER_MULTILINE_DEFAULT_MAX_LINES 24
/*
* maximum length of an unterminated message (a received line without
* end-of-line) and of the accumulated "005" (ISUPPORT) data; these limits
* protect against a server sending a huge amount of data without end-of-line
* (or a flood of "005" messages), which would consume all the memory
*/
#define IRC_SERVER_RECV_MSG_MAX_LENGTH (64 * 1024)
#define IRC_SERVER_ISUPPORT_MAX_LENGTH (64 * 1024)
/* casemapping (string comparisons for nicks/channels) */
enum t_irc_server_casemapping
{
@@ -3866,6 +3866,44 @@ TEST(IrcProtocolWithServer, 005_full)
STRCMP_EQUAL(IRC_MSG_005 " " IRC_MSG_005, ptr_server->isupport);
}
/*
* Test functions:
* irc_protocol_cb_005 (accumulated ISUPPORT is bounded)
*/
TEST(IrcProtocolWithServer, 005_limit)
{
char str_msg[4096], str_value[3500];
size_t length1, length2;
int i;
SRV_INIT;
memset (str_value, 'X', sizeof (str_value) - 1);
str_value[sizeof (str_value) - 1] = '\0';
snprintf (str_msg, sizeof (str_msg),
":server 005 alice TEST=%s :are supported", str_value);
/* flood the server with "005" messages */
for (i = 0; i < 100; i++)
{
server_recv (str_msg);
}
CHECK(ptr_server->isupport);
length1 = strlen (ptr_server->isupport);
/* the accumulated ISUPPORT data must be bounded */
CHECK(length1 <= IRC_SERVER_ISUPPORT_MAX_LENGTH + sizeof (str_value));
/* receiving more "005" messages must not grow it any further */
for (i = 0; i < 100; i++)
{
server_recv (str_msg);
}
length2 = strlen (ptr_server->isupport);
LONGS_EQUAL(length1, length2);
}
/*
* Test functions:
* irc_protocol_cb_005 (infos from server, multiple messages)
@@ -65,6 +65,49 @@ TEST(IrcServer, Valid)
irc_server_free (server);
}
/*
* Test functions:
* irc_server_msgq_add_unterminated (via irc_server_msgq_add_buffer)
*
* Check that data received without any end-of-line does not grow the
* unterminated message buffer without limit.
*/
TEST(IrcServer, MsgqAddBufferLimit)
{
struct t_irc_server *server;
char chunk[4097];
int i;
size_t length1, length2;
server = irc_server_alloc ("server_msgq");
CHECK(server);
memset (chunk, 'a', sizeof (chunk) - 1);
chunk[sizeof (chunk) - 1] = '\0';
/* feed a lot of data with no end-of-line */
for (i = 0; i < 100; i++)
{
irc_server_msgq_add_buffer (server, chunk);
}
CHECK(server->unterminated_message);
length1 = strlen (server->unterminated_message);
/* the buffer must be bounded (not ~400 KB) */
CHECK(length1 <= IRC_SERVER_RECV_MSG_MAX_LENGTH + sizeof (chunk));
/* feeding more data must not grow the buffer any further */
for (i = 0; i < 100; i++)
{
irc_server_msgq_add_buffer (server, chunk);
}
length2 = strlen (server->unterminated_message);
LONGS_EQUAL(length1, length2);
irc_server_free (server);
}
/*
* Test functions:
* irc_server_search