ci: bump poexam to version 0.0.12

With permessage-deflate, RSV1 of the first fragment indicates whether or
not the message is compressed [1]. If RSV1 is not set then the message
should not be decompressed.

[1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7692#section-6

.github/workflows/ci.yml

@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ jobs:
         sudo apt-get update -qq
         sudo apt-get --yes --no-install-recommends install ${{ env.CHECK_DEPS_UBUNTU }}
         pipx install msgcheck ruff
-        cargo install --version 0.0.10 poexam
+        cargo install --version 0.0.12 poexam
 
     - name: Check gettext files (msgcheck)
       run: msgcheck po/*.po
@@ -280,8 +280,10 @@ jobs:
 
     - name: Install dependencies
       run: |
-        dnf install -y epel-release
+        dnf install -y epel-release dnf-plugins-core
         dnf config-manager --set-enabled crb
+        # pin a working ruby stream (ruby:4.0 has broken module metadata on Rocky 9.8)
+        dnf module enable -y ruby:3.3
         dnf install -y ${{ env.WEECHAT_DEPS_ROCKYLINUX }}
 
     - name: Build and run tests

.poexam/poexam.toml

@@ -7,9 +7,11 @@ select = [
     "checks",
 ]
 ignore = [
+    "acronyms",
     "brackets",
     "double-quotes",
     "double-words",
+    "functions",
     "header",
     "html-tags",
     "paths",

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -6,15 +6,37 @@ SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
 
 # WeeChat ChangeLog
 
+## Version 4.9.3 (under dev)
+
+### Fixed
+
+- core: fix buffer overflow in connection to SOCKS5 proxy ([#2325](https://github.com/weechat/weechat/issues/2325))
+- relay/api: fix memory leak in resources "handshake", "input" and "completion"
+- relay: fix read of uncompressed websocket frame ([#2331](https://github.com/weechat/weechat/issues/2331))
+- xfer: fix out-of-bounds write in xfer file transfer resume ([#2326](https://github.com/weechat/weechat/issues/2326))
+
+## Version 4.9.2 (2026-06-07)
+
+### Fixed
+
+- api: fix infinite loop in function string_replace when the search string is empty
+- irc: limit size of data received from the server to prevent memory exhaustion
+- irc: fix out-of-bounds read on incoming DCC command with a quoted filename ending the message ([#2322](https://github.com/weechat/weechat/issues/2322))
+- relay: limit size of received websocket frame and HTTP body to prevent memory exhaustion
+- relay: limit size of partial message received while reading an HTTP request to prevent memory exhaustion
+- relay: fix out-of-bounds read in dump of data ([#2324](https://github.com/weechat/weechat/issues/2324))
+- xfer: replace directory separator in remote nick by underscore in download filename to prevent writing the file outside the download directory ([#2321](https://github.com/weechat/weechat/issues/2321))
+- xfer: fix out-of-bounds read when receiving empty line in DCC chat ([#2323](https://github.com/weechat/weechat/issues/2323))
+
 ## Version 4.9.1 (2026-05-31)
 
 ### Fixed
 
 - core: fix option weechat.look.color_real_white not applied when color is "white" on 16+ colors terminals ([#1742](https://github.com/weechat/weechat/issues/1742))
 - irc: fix tag in message with list of names when joining a channel
-- relay: limit size of decompressed websocket frame with permessage-deflate to prevent memory exhaustion ([GHSA-v2v4-45wm-5cr3](https://github.com/weechat/weechat/security/advisories/GHSA-v2v4-45wm-5cr3))
+- relay: limit size of decompressed websocket frame with permessage-deflate to prevent memory exhaustion ([GHSA-v2v4-45wm-5cr3](https://github.com/weechat/weechat/security/advisories/GHSA-v2v4-45wm-5cr3), [CVE-2026-53524](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2026-53524))
-- relay: fix timing attack on password authentication ([GHSA-vhv8-g2r9-cwcc](https://github.com/weechat/weechat/security/advisories/GHSA-vhv8-g2r9-cwcc))
+- relay: fix timing attack on password authentication ([GHSA-vhv8-g2r9-cwcc](https://github.com/weechat/weechat/security/advisories/GHSA-vhv8-g2r9-cwcc), [CVE-2026-53525](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2026-53525))
-- api, relay: fix timing attack on TOTP validation ([GHSA-vhv8-g2r9-cwcc](https://github.com/weechat/weechat/security/advisories/GHSA-vhv8-g2r9-cwcc))
+- api, relay: fix timing attack on TOTP validation ([GHSA-vhv8-g2r9-cwcc](https://github.com/weechat/weechat/security/advisories/GHSA-vhv8-g2r9-cwcc), [CVE-2026-53525](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2026-53525))
 
 ## Version 4.9.0 (2026-03-29)
 

doc/en/weechat_relay_api.en.adoc

@@ -1028,6 +1028,13 @@ Path parameters:
   confused with the buffer number, which is different)
 * `buffer_name` (string, **required**): buffer name
 
+Query parameters:
+
+* `colors` (string, optional, default: `ansi`): how to return strings with color codes:
+** `ansi`: return ANSI color codes
+** `weechat`: return WeeChat internal color codes
+** `strip`: strip colors
+
 Request example: get nicks of a buffer:
 
 [source,shell]

doc/fr/weechat_relay_api.fr.adoc

@@ -1040,6 +1040,14 @@ Paramètres de chemin :
   confondre avec le numéro du tampon, qui est différent)
 * `buffer_name` (chaîne, **obligatoire**) : nom du tampon
 
+Paramètres de requête :
+
+* `colors` (chaîne, facultatif, par défaut : `ansi`) : comment les chaînes avec
+  des couleurs sont retournées :
+** `ansi` : retourner les codes couleur ANSI
+** `weechat` : retourner les codes couleur internes WeeChat
+** `strip` : supprimer les couleurs
+
 Exemple de requête : obtenir les pseudos d'un tampon :
 
 [source,shell]

doc/sr/weechat_relay_api.sr.adoc

@@ -1024,12 +1024,19 @@ GET /api/buffers/{id_бафера}/nicks
 GET /api/buffers/{име_бафера}/nicks
 ----
 
-Параметри упита:
+Параметри путање:
 
 * `id_бафера` (цео број, **обавезно**): јединствени идентификатор бафера (не треба
   да се помеша са бројем бафера, то је нешто друго)
 * `име_бафера` (стринг, **обавезно**): име бафера
 
+Параметри упита:
+
+* `colors` (стринг, није обавезно, подразумевано: `ansi`): како се враћају стрингови са кодовима боје:
+** `ansi`: враћају се ANSI кодови боје
+** `weechat`: враћају се WeeChat интерни кодови боје
+** `strip`: уклањају се боје
+
 Пример захтева: врати надимке бафера:
 
 [source,shell]

po/de.po

@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ msgstr ""
 "Project-Id-Version: WeeChat\n"
 "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: flashcode@flashtux.org\n"
 "POT-Creation-Date: 2026-03-21 17:24+0100\n"
-"PO-Revision-Date: 2026-03-21 17:24+0100\n"
+"PO-Revision-Date: 2026-07-03 08:28+0200\n"
 "Last-Translator: Nils Görs <weechatter@arcor.de>\n"
 "Language-Team: German <kde-i18n-de@kde.org>\n"
 "Language: de_DE\n"
@@ -17330,7 +17330,7 @@ msgstr ""
 "Um Tastenkurzbefehle im Skript-Buffer direkt nutzen zu können (zum Beispiel: "
 "alt+i = installieren, alt+r = entfernen, ...), muss diese Einstellung "
 "aktiviert werden. Andernfalls können Aktionen nur über die Eingabezeile "
-"durchgeführt werden: i,r..."
+"durchgeführt werden: i,r, ..."
 
 msgid "color for status \"autoloaded\" (\"a\")"
 msgstr "Farbe in der der Status \"autoloaded\" (\"a\") dargestellt werden soll"

src/core/core-network.c

@@ -581,7 +581,13 @@ network_pass_socks5proxy (struct t_proxy *proxy, int sock, const char *address,
                           int port)
 {
     struct t_network_socks5 socks5;
-    unsigned char buffer[288];
+    /*
+     * buffer must be large enough for the username/password authentication
+     * request, which is the longest message sent/received here; according to
+     * RFC 1929 it is: version (1) + username length (1) + username (max 255)
+     * + password length (1) + password (max 255)
+     */
+    unsigned char buffer[2 + 255 + 1 + 255];
     int username_len, password_len, addr_len, addr_buffer_len;
     unsigned char *addr_buffer;
     char *username, *password;
@@ -630,6 +636,18 @@ network_pass_socks5proxy (struct t_proxy *proxy, int sock, const char *address,
         username_len = strlen (username);
         password_len = strlen (password);
 
+        /*
+         * username and password length are each stored on a single byte
+         * (RFC 1929), so they cannot exceed 255 bytes: reject longer values,
+         * otherwise the memcpy calls below would overflow the buffer
+         */
+        if ((username_len > 255) || (password_len > 255))
+        {
+            free (username);
+            free (password);
+            return 0;
+        }
+
         /* make username/password buffer */
         buffer[0] = 1;
         buffer[1] = (unsigned char) username_len;

src/core/core-string.c

@@ -1965,6 +1965,9 @@ string_replace (const char *string, const char *search, const char *replace)
     if (!string || !search || !replace)
         return NULL;
 
+    if (!search[0])
+        return strdup (string);
+
     length1 = strlen (search);
     length2 = strlen (replace);
 

src/gui/gui-buffer.c

@@ -3804,6 +3804,7 @@ gui_buffer_close (struct t_gui_buffer *buffer)
 
     gui_hotlist_remove_buffer (buffer, 1);
     free (buffer->hotlist_removed);
+    buffer->hotlist_removed = NULL;
     if (gui_hotlist_initial_buffer == buffer)
         gui_hotlist_initial_buffer = NULL;
 
@@ -3822,55 +3823,85 @@ gui_buffer_close (struct t_gui_buffer *buffer)
     /* free all lines */
     gui_line_free_all (buffer);
     free (buffer->own_lines);
+    buffer->own_lines = NULL;
     free (buffer->mixed_lines);
+    buffer->mixed_lines = NULL;
 
     /* free some data */
     gui_buffer_undo_free_all (buffer);
     gui_history_buffer_free (buffer);
     gui_completion_free (buffer->completion);
+    buffer->completion = NULL;
     gui_nicklist_remove_all (buffer);
     gui_nicklist_remove_group (buffer, buffer->nicklist_root);
+    buffer->nicklist_root = NULL;
     hashtable_free (buffer->hotlist_max_level_nicks);
+    buffer->hotlist_max_level_nicks = NULL;
     gui_key_free_all (-1, &buffer->keys, &buffer->last_key,
                       &buffer->keys_count, 0);
     gui_buffer_local_var_remove_all (buffer);
     hashtable_free (buffer->local_variables);
+    buffer->local_variables = NULL;
     free (buffer->plugin_name_for_upgrade);
+    buffer->plugin_name_for_upgrade = NULL;
     free (buffer->name);
+    buffer->name = NULL;
     free (buffer->full_name);
+    buffer->full_name = NULL;
     free (buffer->old_full_name);
+    buffer->old_full_name = NULL;
     free (buffer->short_name);
+    buffer->short_name = NULL;
     free (buffer->title);
+    buffer->title = NULL;
     free (buffer->modes);
+    buffer->modes = NULL;
     free (buffer->input_prompt);
+    buffer->input_prompt = NULL;
     free (buffer->input_buffer);
+    buffer->input_buffer = NULL;
     free (buffer->input_undo_snap);
+    buffer->input_undo_snap = NULL;
     free (buffer->text_search_input);
+    buffer->text_search_input = NULL;
     if (buffer->text_search_regex_compiled)
     {
         regfree (buffer->text_search_regex_compiled);
         free (buffer->text_search_regex_compiled);
+        buffer->text_search_regex_compiled = NULL;
     }
     free (buffer->highlight_words);
+    buffer->highlight_words = NULL;
     free (buffer->highlight_disable_regex);
+    buffer->highlight_disable_regex = NULL;
     if (buffer->highlight_disable_regex_compiled)
     {
         regfree (buffer->highlight_disable_regex_compiled);
         free (buffer->highlight_disable_regex_compiled);
+        buffer->highlight_disable_regex_compiled = NULL;
     }
     free (buffer->highlight_regex);
+    buffer->highlight_regex = NULL;
     if (buffer->highlight_regex_compiled)
     {
         regfree (buffer->highlight_regex_compiled);
         free (buffer->highlight_regex_compiled);
+        buffer->highlight_regex_compiled = NULL;
     }
     free (buffer->highlight_tags_restrict);
+    buffer->highlight_tags_restrict = NULL;
     string_free_split_tags (buffer->highlight_tags_restrict_array);
+    buffer->highlight_tags_restrict_array = NULL;
     free (buffer->highlight_tags);
+    buffer->highlight_tags = NULL;
     string_free_split_tags (buffer->highlight_tags_array);
+    buffer->highlight_tags_array = NULL;
     free (buffer->input_callback_data);
+    buffer->input_callback_data = NULL;
     free (buffer->close_callback_data);
+    buffer->close_callback_data = NULL;
     free (buffer->nickcmp_callback_data);
+    buffer->nickcmp_callback_data = NULL;
 
     /* remove buffer from buffers list */
     if (buffer->prev_buffer)

src/plugins/irc/irc-ctcp.c

@@ -857,7 +857,7 @@ irc_ctcp_recv_dcc (struct t_irc_protocol_ctxt *ctxt, const char *arguments)
              * double-quote
              */
             pos = strrchr (pos_file, '"');
-            if (!pos || (pos == pos_file))
+            if (!pos || (pos == pos_file) || !pos[1])
             {
                 weechat_printf (
                     ctxt->server->buffer,
@@ -1032,7 +1032,7 @@ irc_ctcp_recv_dcc (struct t_irc_protocol_ctxt *ctxt, const char *arguments)
              * double-quote
              */
             pos = strrchr (pos_file, '"');
-            if (!pos || (pos == pos_file))
+            if (!pos || (pos == pos_file) || !pos[1])
             {
                 weechat_printf (
                     ctxt->server->buffer,
@@ -1176,7 +1176,7 @@ irc_ctcp_recv_dcc (struct t_irc_protocol_ctxt *ctxt, const char *arguments)
              * double-quote
              */
             pos = strrchr (pos_file, '"');
-            if (!pos || (pos == pos_file))
+            if (!pos || (pos == pos_file) || !pos[1])
             {
                 weechat_printf (
                     ctxt->server->buffer,

src/plugins/irc/irc-protocol.c

@@ -4164,16 +4164,25 @@ IRC_PROTOCOL_CALLBACK(005)
         if (ctxt->server->isupport)
         {
             length_isupport = strlen (ctxt->server->isupport);
-            isupport2 = realloc (ctxt->server->isupport,
+            /*
-                                 length_isupport +  /* existing */
+             * limit the size of the accumulated ISUPPORT data: once the
-                                 1 +  /* space */
+             * maximum is reached, ignore the extra data (protection against a
-                                 length +  /* new */
+             * server flooding "005" messages, which would consume all the
-                                 1);
+             * memory)
-            if (isupport2)
+             */
+            if (length_isupport + 1 + length < IRC_SERVER_ISUPPORT_MAX_LENGTH)
             {
-                ctxt->server->isupport = isupport2;
+                isupport2 = realloc (ctxt->server->isupport,
-                strcat (ctxt->server->isupport, " ");
+                                     length_isupport +  /* existing */
-                strcat (ctxt->server->isupport, str_info);
+                                     1 +  /* space */
+                                     length +  /* new */
+                                     1);
+                if (isupport2)
+                {
+                    ctxt->server->isupport = isupport2;
+                    strcat (ctxt->server->isupport, " ");
+                    strcat (ctxt->server->isupport, str_info);
+                }
             }
         }
         else

src/plugins/irc/irc-server.c

@@ -3409,6 +3409,14 @@ irc_server_msgq_add_unterminated (struct t_irc_server *server,
 
     if (server->unterminated_message)
     {
+        /*
+         * limit the size of the unterminated message: once the maximum is
+         * reached, ignore the extra data (protection against a server sending
+         * a very long line without end-of-line, which would consume all the
+         * memory)
+         */
+        if (strlen (server->unterminated_message) >= IRC_SERVER_RECV_MSG_MAX_LENGTH)
+            return;
         unterminated_message2 =
             realloc (server->unterminated_message,
                      (strlen (server->unterminated_message) +

src/plugins/irc/irc-server.h

@@ -144,6 +144,15 @@ enum t_irc_server_option
 #define IRC_SERVER_MULTILINE_DEFAULT_MAX_BYTES 4096
 #define IRC_SERVER_MULTILINE_DEFAULT_MAX_LINES 24
 
+/*
+ * maximum length of an unterminated message (a received line without
+ * end-of-line) and of the accumulated "005" (ISUPPORT) data; these limits
+ * protect against a server sending a huge amount of data without end-of-line
+ * (or a flood of "005" messages), which would consume all the memory
+ */
+#define IRC_SERVER_RECV_MSG_MAX_LENGTH (64 * 1024)
+#define IRC_SERVER_ISUPPORT_MAX_LENGTH (64 * 1024)
+
 /* casemapping (string comparisons for nicks/channels) */
 enum t_irc_server_casemapping
 {

src/plugins/relay/api/relay-api-protocol.c

@@ -402,7 +402,10 @@ RELAY_API_PROTOCOL_CALLBACK(handshake)
     if (json_body)
     {
         if (!cJSON_IsObject (json_body))
+        {
+            cJSON_Delete (json_body);
             return RELAY_API_PROTOCOL_RC_BAD_REQUEST;
+        }
         json_algos = cJSON_GetObjectItem (json_body, "password_hash_algo");
         if (json_algos)
         {
@@ -781,8 +784,13 @@ RELAY_API_PROTOCOL_CALLBACK(input)
     char str_delay[32];
 
     json_body = cJSON_Parse (client->http_req->body);
-    if (!json_body || !cJSON_IsObject (json_body))
+    if (!json_body)
         return RELAY_API_PROTOCOL_RC_BAD_REQUEST;
+    if (!cJSON_IsObject (json_body))
+    {
+        cJSON_Delete (json_body);
+        return RELAY_API_PROTOCOL_RC_BAD_REQUEST;
+    }
 
     /* get buffer either by name or by id */
     ptr_buffer = NULL;
@@ -908,8 +916,13 @@ RELAY_API_PROTOCOL_CALLBACK(completion)
     struct t_gui_buffer *ptr_buffer;
 
     json_body = cJSON_Parse (client->http_req->body);
-    if (!json_body || !cJSON_IsObject(json_body))
+    if (!json_body)
         return RELAY_API_PROTOCOL_RC_BAD_REQUEST;
+    if (!cJSON_IsObject(json_body))
+    {
+        cJSON_Delete (json_body);
+        return RELAY_API_PROTOCOL_RC_BAD_REQUEST;
+    }
 
     /* get buffer either by name or by id */
     ptr_buffer = NULL;

src/plugins/relay/relay-http.c

@@ -513,6 +513,19 @@ relay_http_add_to_body (struct t_relay_http_request *request,
     if (!partial_message || !*partial_message)
         return;
 
+    /*
+     * reject the body if its announced length is too big: this prevents a
+     * client from forcing an unbounded allocation by announcing a huge
+     * "Content-Length"
+     */
+    if (request->content_length > RELAY_HTTP_BODY_MAX_LENGTH)
+    {
+        free (*partial_message);
+        *partial_message = NULL;
+        request->status = RELAY_HTTP_END;
+        return;
+    }
+
     num_bytes_missing = request->content_length
         - request->body_size;
     if (num_bytes_missing <= 0)
@@ -993,6 +1006,14 @@ relay_http_recv (struct t_relay_client *client, const char *data, int size)
 
     if (client->partial_message)
     {
+        /*
+         * limit the size of the partial message: once the maximum is reached,
+         * ignore the extra data (protection against a client sending a huge
+         * amount of data without any end-of-line and dribbling it, which would
+         * consume all the memory)
+         */
+        if (strlen (client->partial_message) >= RELAY_HTTP_PARTIAL_MESSAGE_MAX_LENGTH)
+            return;
         new_partial = realloc (client->partial_message,
                                strlen (client->partial_message) +
                                strlen (data) + 1);
@@ -1695,7 +1716,7 @@ relay_http_print_log_request (struct t_relay_http_request *request)
     weechat_log_printf ("    path_items. . . . . . . : %p", request->path_items);
     if (request->path_items)
     {
-        for (i = 0; request->path_items[0]; i++)
+        for (i = 0; request->path_items[i]; i++)
         {
             weechat_log_printf ("      '%s'", request->path_items[i]);
         }

src/plugins/relay/relay-http.h

@@ -57,6 +57,22 @@ enum t_relay_client_http_status
 #define RELAY_HTTP_ERROR_METHOD_NOT_ALLOWED   "Method Not Allowed"
 #define RELAY_HTTP_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY        "Out of memory"
 
+/*
+ * maximum length of an HTTP request body: used as an upper bound on the
+ * "Content-Length" accepted from a client, to prevent a client from forcing
+ * an unbounded allocation by announcing a huge body
+ */
+#define RELAY_HTTP_BODY_MAX_LENGTH (8 * 1024 * 1024)
+
+/*
+ * maximum length of the partial message accumulated while reading an HTTP
+ * request: once this limit is reached, the extra data is ignored; this
+ * protects against a client sending a huge amount of data without any
+ * end-of-line (an unterminated method or header line), which would consume
+ * all the memory
+ */
+#define RELAY_HTTP_PARTIAL_MESSAGE_MAX_LENGTH (8 * 1024 * 1024)
+
 struct t_relay_http_request
 {
     enum t_relay_client_http_status status; /* HTTP status                  */

src/plugins/relay/relay-websocket.c

@@ -653,7 +653,7 @@ relay_websocket_decode_frame (const unsigned char *buffer,
     size_t size_decompressed;
     char *payload_decompressed;
     struct t_relay_websocket_frame *frames2, *ptr_frame;
-    int size, masked_frame, mask[4];
+    int size, compressed, masked_frame, mask[4];
 
     if (!buffer || !frames || !num_frames)
         return 0;
@@ -674,6 +674,9 @@ relay_websocket_decode_frame (const unsigned char *buffer,
 
         opcode = buffer[index_buffer] & 15;
 
+        /* RSV1 indicates whether this message is compressed */
+        compressed = (buffer[index_buffer] & 64) ? 1 : 0;
+
         /* check if frame is masked */
         masked_frame = (buffer[index_buffer + 1] & 128) ? 1 : 0;
 
@@ -703,6 +706,14 @@ relay_websocket_decode_frame (const unsigned char *buffer,
             index_buffer += length_frame_size;
         }
 
+        /*
+         * reject the frame if its announced length is too big: this prevents
+         * a client from forcing an unbounded allocation (and unbounded
+         * accumulation of partial frames) by announcing a huge frame
+         */
+        if (length_frame > WEBSOCKET_FRAME_MAX_LENGTH)
+            return 0;
+
         if (masked_frame)
         {
             /* read mask (4 bytes) */
@@ -772,9 +783,9 @@ relay_websocket_decode_frame (const unsigned char *buffer,
 
         /*
          * decompress data if frame is not empty and if "permessage-deflate"
-         * is enabled
+         * is enabled and the message is compressed
          */
-        if ((length_frame > 0) && ws_deflate && ws_deflate->enabled)
+        if ((length_frame > 0) && ws_deflate && ws_deflate->enabled && compressed)
         {
             if (!ws_deflate->strm_inflate)
             {

src/plugins/relay/relay-websocket.h

@@ -41,6 +41,14 @@
 
 #define WEBSOCKET_SUB_PROTOCOL_API_WEECHAT "api.weechat"
 
+/*
+ * maximum length of a websocket frame received from a client (or a remote
+ * WeeChat): used as an upper bound on the announced frame payload length, to
+ * prevent a client from forcing an unbounded allocation by announcing a huge
+ * frame and dribbling its payload
+ */
+#define WEBSOCKET_FRAME_MAX_LENGTH (8 * 1024 * 1024)
+
 /*
  * maximum size of a decompressed websocket frame (with "permessage-deflate"):
  * used as an upper bound when inflating, to prevent a small compressed frame

src/plugins/xfer/xfer-chat.c

@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ xfer_chat_recv_cb (const void *pointer, void *data, int fd)
             {
                 ctcp_action = 0;
                 length = strlen (ptr_buf);
-                if (ptr_buf[length - 1] == '\r')
+                if ((length > 0) && (ptr_buf[length - 1] == '\r'))
                 {
                     ptr_buf[length - 1] = '\0';
                     length--;

src/plugins/xfer/xfer-dcc.c

@@ -242,8 +242,8 @@ int
 xfer_dcc_resume_hash (struct t_xfer *xfer)
 {
     char *buf;
-    unsigned long long total_read;
+    unsigned long long total_read, length_buf, to_read;
-    ssize_t length_buf, to_read, num_read;
+    ssize_t num_read;
     int ret, fd;
 
     total_read = 0;

src/plugins/xfer/xfer-file.c

@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ xfer_file_find_suffix (struct t_xfer *xfer)
 void
 xfer_file_find_filename (struct t_xfer *xfer)
 {
-    char *dir_separator, *path;
+    char *dir_separator, *path, *nick;
     struct t_hashtable *options;
 
     if (!XFER_IS_FILE(xfer->type))
@@ -287,12 +287,20 @@ xfer_file_find_filename (struct t_xfer *xfer)
     {
         strcat (xfer->local_filename, dir_separator);
     }
-    free (dir_separator);
     if (weechat_config_boolean (xfer_config_file_use_nick_in_filename))
     {
-        strcat (xfer->local_filename, xfer->remote_nick);
+        /*
+         * the remote nick comes from the server and can contain a directory
+         * separator: replace it so the nick cannot make the file be written
+         * outside the download directory
+         */
+        nick = (dir_separator) ?
+            weechat_string_replace (xfer->remote_nick, dir_separator, "_") : NULL;
+        strcat (xfer->local_filename, (nick) ? nick : xfer->remote_nick);
+        free (nick);
         strcat (xfer->local_filename, ".");
     }
+    free (dir_separator);
     strcat (xfer->local_filename, xfer->filename);
 
     free (path);

tests/unit/core/test-core-string.cpp

@@ -1454,6 +1454,8 @@ TEST(CoreString, Replace)
     WEE_TEST_STR(NULL, string_replace ("string", NULL, "replace"));
     WEE_TEST_STR(NULL, string_replace (NULL, "search", "replace"));
 
+    WEE_TEST_STR("test abc def", string_replace("test abc def", "", "xxx"));
+
     WEE_TEST_STR("test abc def", string_replace("test abc def", "xyz", "xxx"));
     WEE_TEST_STR("test xxx def", string_replace("test abc def", "abc", "xxx"));
     WEE_TEST_STR("xxx test xxx def xxx",

tests/unit/plugins/irc/test-irc-protocol.cpp

@@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ TEST_GROUP(IrcProtocolWithServer)
 
     void server_recv (const char *command)
     {
-        char str_command[4096];
+        char str_command[8192];
 
         record_start ();
         arraylist_clear (sent_messages);
@@ -3866,6 +3866,44 @@ TEST(IrcProtocolWithServer, 005_full)
     STRCMP_EQUAL(IRC_MSG_005 " " IRC_MSG_005, ptr_server->isupport);
 }
 
+/*
+ * Test functions:
+ *   irc_protocol_cb_005 (accumulated ISUPPORT is bounded)
+ */
+
+TEST(IrcProtocolWithServer, 005_limit)
+{
+    char str_msg[4096], str_value[3500];
+    size_t length1, length2;
+    int i;
+
+    SRV_INIT;
+
+    memset (str_value, 'X', sizeof (str_value) - 1);
+    str_value[sizeof (str_value) - 1] = '\0';
+    snprintf (str_msg, sizeof (str_msg),
+              ":server 005 alice TEST=%s :are supported", str_value);
+
+    /* flood the server with "005" messages */
+    for (i = 0; i < 100; i++)
+    {
+        server_recv (str_msg);
+    }
+    CHECK(ptr_server->isupport);
+    length1 = strlen (ptr_server->isupport);
+
+    /* the accumulated ISUPPORT data must be bounded */
+    CHECK(length1 <= IRC_SERVER_ISUPPORT_MAX_LENGTH + sizeof (str_value));
+
+    /* receiving more "005" messages must not grow it any further */
+    for (i = 0; i < 100; i++)
+    {
+        server_recv (str_msg);
+    }
+    length2 = strlen (ptr_server->isupport);
+    LONGS_EQUAL(length1, length2);
+}
+
 /*
  * Test functions:
  *   irc_protocol_cb_005 (infos from server, multiple messages)

tests/unit/plugins/irc/test-irc-server.cpp

@@ -65,6 +65,49 @@ TEST(IrcServer, Valid)
     irc_server_free (server);
 }
 
+/*
+ * Test functions:
+ *   irc_server_msgq_add_unterminated (via irc_server_msgq_add_buffer)
+ *
+ * Check that data received without any end-of-line does not grow the
+ * unterminated message buffer without limit.
+ */
+
+TEST(IrcServer, MsgqAddBufferLimit)
+{
+    struct t_irc_server *server;
+    char chunk[4097];
+    int i;
+    size_t length1, length2;
+
+    server = irc_server_alloc ("server_msgq");
+    CHECK(server);
+
+    memset (chunk, 'a', sizeof (chunk) - 1);
+    chunk[sizeof (chunk) - 1] = '\0';
+
+    /* feed a lot of data with no end-of-line */
+    for (i = 0; i < 100; i++)
+    {
+        irc_server_msgq_add_buffer (server, chunk);
+    }
+    CHECK(server->unterminated_message);
+    length1 = strlen (server->unterminated_message);
+
+    /* the buffer must be bounded (not ~400 KB) */
+    CHECK(length1 <= IRC_SERVER_RECV_MSG_MAX_LENGTH + sizeof (chunk));
+
+    /* feeding more data must not grow the buffer any further */
+    for (i = 0; i < 100; i++)
+    {
+        irc_server_msgq_add_buffer (server, chunk);
+    }
+    length2 = strlen (server->unterminated_message);
+    LONGS_EQUAL(length1, length2);
+
+    irc_server_free (server);
+}
+
 /*
  * Test functions:
  *   irc_server_search

tests/unit/plugins/relay/test-relay-http.cpp

@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ extern "C"
 #include "src/plugins/relay/relay-client.h"
 #include "src/plugins/relay/relay-config.h"
 #include "src/plugins/relay/relay-http.h"
+#include "src/plugins/relay/relay-server.h"
 #include "src/plugins/relay/relay-websocket.h"
 #include "src/plugins/weechat-plugin.h"
 
@@ -161,6 +162,35 @@ TEST(RelayHttp, RequestAllocReinitFree)
     relay_http_request_free (request);
 }
 
+/*
+ * Test functions:
+ *   relay_http_add_to_body (body too large is rejected)
+ */
+
+TEST(RelayHttp, AddToBodyLimit)
+{
+    struct t_relay_http_request *request;
+    char *partial;
+
+    request = relay_http_request_alloc ();
+    CHECK(request);
+
+    /* announce a body larger than the maximum allowed */
+    request->status = RELAY_HTTP_BODY;
+    request->content_length = RELAY_HTTP_BODY_MAX_LENGTH + 1;
+    partial = strdup ("some body data");
+
+    relay_http_add_to_body (request, &partial);
+
+    /* the body must be rejected: nothing allocated, request ended */
+    POINTERS_EQUAL(NULL, request->body);
+    LONGS_EQUAL(0, request->body_size);
+    POINTERS_EQUAL(NULL, partial);
+    LONGS_EQUAL(RELAY_HTTP_END, request->status);
+
+    relay_http_request_free (request);
+}
+
 /*
  * Test functions:
  *   relay_http_url_decode
@@ -992,6 +1022,69 @@ TEST(RelayHttp, Recv)
     /* TODO: write tests */
 }
 
+/*
+ * Test functions:
+ *   relay_http_recv (partial message accumulated is bounded)
+ *
+ * Check that data received without any end-of-line does not grow the partial
+ * message buffer without limit.
+ */
+
+TEST(RelayHttp, RecvLimit)
+{
+    struct t_relay_server *server;
+    struct t_relay_client *client;
+    char *chunk;
+    int chunk_size, i;
+    size_t length1, length2;
+
+    /* disable auto-open of relay buffer (it would pollute other tests) */
+    config_file_option_set (relay_config_look_auto_open_buffer, "off", 1);
+
+    server = relay_server_new ("weechat", RELAY_PROTOCOL_WEECHAT, NULL,
+                               9000,
+                               NULL,  /* path */
+                               1,  /* ipv4 */
+                               0,  /* ipv6 */
+                               0,  /* tls */
+                               0);  /* unix_socket */
+    CHECK(server);
+    client = relay_client_new (-1, "test", server);
+    CHECK(client);
+
+    chunk_size = 1024 * 1024;
+    chunk = (char *)malloc (chunk_size + 1);
+    CHECK(chunk);
+    memset (chunk, 'a', chunk_size);
+    chunk[chunk_size] = '\0';
+
+    /* feed more than the maximum, with no end-of-line (16 MB) */
+    for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+    {
+        relay_http_recv (client, chunk, chunk_size);
+    }
+    CHECK(client->partial_message);
+    length1 = strlen (client->partial_message);
+
+    /* the partial message must be bounded (not ~16 MB) */
+    CHECK(length1 <= RELAY_HTTP_PARTIAL_MESSAGE_MAX_LENGTH + (size_t)chunk_size);
+
+    /* feeding more data must not grow it any further */
+    for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+    {
+        relay_http_recv (client, chunk, chunk_size);
+    }
+    length2 = strlen (client->partial_message);
+    LONGS_EQUAL(length1, length2);
+
+    free (chunk);
+    relay_client_free (client);
+    relay_server_free (server);
+
+    /* restore auto-open of relay buffer */
+    config_file_option_reset (relay_config_look_auto_open_buffer, 1);
+}
+
 /*
  * Test functions:
  *   relay_http_compress

tests/unit/plugins/relay/test-relay-websocket.cpp

@@ -510,7 +510,44 @@ TEST(RelayWebsocket, Inflate)
 
 TEST(RelayWebsocket, DecodeFrame)
 {
-    /* TODO: write tests */
+    struct t_relay_websocket_frame *frames;
+    char *partial_ws_frame;
+    int num_frames, partial_ws_frame_size;
+    /* small unmasked binary frame with payload "hello" */
+    unsigned char frame_ok[7] = { 0x82, 0x05, 'h', 'e', 'l', 'l', 'o' };
+    /* masked frame announcing a 1 GB payload (64-bit length field) */
+    unsigned char frame_too_big[10] = {
+        0x82, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x40, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+    };
+
+    /* a valid small frame is decoded */
+    frames = NULL;
+    num_frames = 0;
+    partial_ws_frame = NULL;
+    partial_ws_frame_size = 0;
+    LONGS_EQUAL(1, relay_websocket_decode_frame (
+                    frame_ok, sizeof (frame_ok), 0, NULL,
+                    &frames, &num_frames, &partial_ws_frame,
+                    &partial_ws_frame_size));
+    LONGS_EQUAL(1, num_frames);
+    CHECK(frames);
+    LONGS_EQUAL(5, frames[0].payload_size);
+    MEMCMP_EQUAL("hello", frames[0].payload, 5);
+    free (frames[0].payload);
+    free (frames);
+    free (partial_ws_frame);
+
+    /* a frame announcing an oversized payload is rejected (return 0) */
+    frames = NULL;
+    num_frames = 0;
+    partial_ws_frame = NULL;
+    partial_ws_frame_size = 0;
+    LONGS_EQUAL(0, relay_websocket_decode_frame (
+                    frame_too_big, sizeof (frame_too_big), 1, NULL,
+                    &frames, &num_frames, &partial_ws_frame,
+                    &partial_ws_frame_size));
+    free (frames);
+    free (partial_ws_frame);
 }
 
 /*

tests/unit/plugins/xfer/test-xfer-file.cpp

@@ -25,6 +25,11 @@
 
 extern "C"
 {
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include "src/core/core-config-file.h"
+#include "src/plugins/xfer/xfer.h"
+#include "src/plugins/xfer/xfer-config.h"
 #include "src/plugins/xfer/xfer-file.h"
 }
 
@@ -32,6 +37,42 @@ TEST_GROUP(XferFile)
 {
 };
 
+/*
+ * Build a "file recv" xfer with the given remote nick (and a fixed filename),
+ * call xfer_file_find_filename and return a copy of the basename of the local
+ * filename (the part after the last directory separator).
+ *
+ * Note: result must be freed after use.
+ */
+
+static char *
+test_find_filename_basename (const char *remote_nick)
+{
+    struct t_xfer xfer;
+    char *pos, *result;
+
+    memset (&xfer, 0, sizeof (xfer));
+    xfer.type = XFER_TYPE_FILE_RECV_ACTIVE;
+    xfer.remote_nick = strdup (remote_nick);
+    xfer.filename = strdup ("test.txt");
+
+    xfer_file_find_filename (&xfer);
+
+    result = NULL;
+    if (xfer.local_filename)
+    {
+        pos = strrchr (xfer.local_filename, DIR_SEPARATOR_CHAR);
+        result = strdup ((pos) ? pos + 1 : xfer.local_filename);
+    }
+
+    free (xfer.remote_nick);
+    free (xfer.filename);
+    free (xfer.local_filename);
+    free (xfer.temp_local_filename);
+
+    return result;
+}
+
 /*
  * Test functions:
  *   xfer_file_search_crc32
@@ -91,7 +132,30 @@ TEST(XferFile, FindSuffix)
 
 TEST(XferFile, FindFilename)
 {
-    /* TODO: write tests */
+    char *basename;
+
+    config_file_option_set (xfer_config_file_download_path, "/tmp/weechat_test_xfer", 1);
+
+    /* remote nick without directory separator: used as-is */
+    basename = test_find_filename_basename ("alice");
+    STRCMP_EQUAL("alice.test.txt", basename);
+    free (basename);
+
+    /*
+     * remote nick with a directory separator: the separator is replaced by
+     * "_" so the nick cannot make the file be written outside the download
+     * directory
+     */
+    basename = test_find_filename_basename ("../foo");
+    STRCMP_EQUAL(".._foo.test.txt", basename);
+    free (basename);
+
+    /* all directory separators in the nick are replaced */
+    basename = test_find_filename_basename ("a/b/c");
+    STRCMP_EQUAL("a_b_c.test.txt", basename);
+    free (basename);
+
+    config_file_option_unset (xfer_config_file_download_path);
 }
 
 /*

version.sh

@@ -41,8 +41,8 @@
 #     devel-number   the devel version as hex number ("0x04010000" for "4.1.0-dev")
 #
 
-weechat_stable="4.9.1"
+weechat_stable="4.9.2"
-weechat_devel="4.9.1"
+weechat_devel="4.9.3-dev"
 
 stable_major=$(echo "${weechat_stable}" | cut -d"." -f1)
 stable_minor=$(echo "${weechat_stable}" | cut -d"." -f2)