When a client is rejected by maxperip (not new) or connthrottle
ipv6-unknown-users-limit (that one is new), a notice to +s +x will be sent.
maxperip ipv4 example:
*** Client testuser4 with IP 1.2.3.4 rejected: maxperip limit exceeded (4 global, max 3)
maxperip ipv6 with /64 example:
*** Client testuser4 with IP 2001:dbe:0:0:0:0:0:4 rejected: maxperip limit exceeded for 2001:dbe::/64 (4 local, max 3)
connthrottle example where /56 limit is exceeded:
*** Client testuser5 with IP 2001:db8:cafe:abcd:0:0:0:5 rejected:
connthrottle ipv6-unknown-users-limit (cidr-56, max 4) exceeded for
2001:db8:cafe::/56 (5 unknown / 0 excepted / 0 known)
Oh and this commit also fixes a typo in existing CONNTHROTTLE events,
which previously were CONNTHROTLE (a missing T).
Changed "Too many connections from your IP" to have "[maxperip]" at the end.
Also create new setting and swap it with existing-one-during-development.
Long story short, we now have 3 different messages for these limits:
set::reject-message::too-many-connections
"Too many connections from your IP [maxperip]"
set::reject-message::too-many-connections-ipv6-range
"Too many connections from your IPv6 range ($prefix_addr/$prefix_len) [maxperip]"
set::reject-message::too-many-new-connections-ipv6-range
"Too many new connections from this IPv6 range ($prefix_addr/$prefix_len) [connthrottle]"
So we explicitly mention whether it is maxperip or connthrottle limiting the
user, that should provide enough clue to the IRCOp if the user pastes the
message to them.
connect-flood and maxperip module. This so they actually take
set::default-ipv6-clone-mask into account.
This also changes the maxperip module to a more simple method of
just freeing all entries and rebuilding the hash table on load.
That's necessary since now set::default-ipv6-clone-mask can change.
We previously upgraded to 1.0.21 and then downgraded to 1.0.20.
Benefit of 1.0.22 is that they also claim to have fixed a warning flood
i am getting with clang 22.
uses their pkg.m4 which made pkg-config a hard requirement.
Such a hard requirement is probably fine later, but.. i don't want
to suddenly require that of users during UnrealIRCd 6 series.
The OOB write did not happen on file-backed downloads, such as remote
includes. It only happened for memory-backed requests, which are only
these 4 in standard UnrealIRCd: centralblocklist, central spam report,
other spamreport blocks (eg to dronebl) and the log block with
destination webhook. All those 4 cases are very likely to be trusted
web servers, given the nature of the data you are sending to them.
The fix was to extend the size fields everywhere to 64 bits. It was
applied to both URL backends: url_unreal.c and url_curl.c.
The new API feature is a 'max_size' in OutgoingWebRequest, which
defaults to 1MB. This is only used for memory-backed responses,
so not for real file downloads. This fixes not only the reported
bug but also the case where a rogue webserver was unbounded in
terms of what response it could send back, potentially filling
up gigabytes of server memory.
Reported by Link420.
This does two things:
* We now only compile src/openssl_hostname_validation.c on
really old OpenSSL's. This was already unused/dead code
for most OpenSSL's but we always compiled it in until now.
* Added 'const' to please OpenSSL 4.0.0 while not breaking
OpenSSL 1.0.x. And yeah i'm happy to drop OpenSSL 1.0.x
support real soon... but not this month yet.
The "not setting +F" stuff didn't work, as due to netmerge - which
can even happen without a split when joining clients on both sides -
this would revert to +F normal basically.
So we just explicitly exempt in the join and msg code.
All this is for unrealircd-tests.
This XML code is only used for DroneBL submission with no user-
controlled variables (except $ip). Still, silly mistake to make
and who knows what other XML stuff will happen in the future.
Version 1.0.21 which we shipped with 6.2.3 has this bug, reported
by PhotoJim at https://bugs.unrealircd.org/view.php?id=6615.
And yes, libsodium also has this weird -stable thing, which does
have the fix, but that's basically just a snapshot of their git
version, it's a .tar.gz that gets updated every X time and it does
not have a GPG signature, while I have the policy nowadays to
verify GPG signatures for libraries we ship. So I am option to just
downgrade a version, for now, which is fine since we shipped with
1.0.20 for quite some time until recently.
There is no hard cap on batch reference length, so we had to make one up.
It is now a clear #define MAXBATCHREFLEN 48, which should be plenty.
No sane client is going to use like a 64 byte batch reference :D
So we did use 48, but we also accidentally used BATCHLEN at another
place. BATCHLEN is 22 and refers to how many bytes we generate, so
that is not appropritate.
Thanks to Valware for spotting this.
This wasn't done before, because optimizing stuff can always introduce
nice new issues. But is kinda necessary now since the previous way was
very inefficient. This now builds all the necessary buffers for multiline
clients and for non-multiline clients. And then iterates through both
types of clients, sending what they need. Instead of doing it the other
way around.
I had the dillema to either expose the linecache API and have everything
in multiline.c. Or, i do not expose linecache, and we do everything in
send.c. The downside of the latter is that if there is mistake then we
can't simply reload (or unload) the module to solve it. So, I have chosen
to expose the linecache API (sure, less clean) since that leaves us with
options if we screw up, plus it means everything related to multiline
sending is nicely in multiline.c, which is i guess just as good as an
argument as well ;)
Add a little fake lag based on history result: 400ms for 50 lines
under normal conditions where 50 lines = 50 lines. But this can go
up to 5000ms for worst-case amplification attacks where requesting
50 lines actually returns 50*15=750 lines when each line is a multiline
with max-lines, which gets you close to 350k+. This would only happen
if someone on the channel is doing evil stuff (with presumably consent
of the ops).
Also guard against hiting max sendq. If we are too close, then we
reject the CHATHISTORY request rather than quiting with "Max SendQ
exceeded". This protects against an attack where someone would be
tricked into joining a channel with amplified history (as explained
in previous paragraph), their client would do an automatic CHATHISTORY
request and then the victim would exceed max sendq and thus be killed.
And yes, this and maaaaany other multiline + history interactions
and many "buts" and security/flood concerns are why this implemtnation
took (and still takes) a lot of hours to get right :D.
For +H we now temporarily allow overshooting. This only matters for low limits.
Multiline batches are atomic so we have to choose to keep them as a whole
or remove the complete batch. So if +H 5:1h and the last message was a 15-line
multiline event, what do we do? We allow temporary overshooting to store the
15 lines. As said, the alternative would be to store 0 lines which would be
worse in terms of functionality, and the small overshoot is defensible.
For higher limits (where the +H line limit is bigger than multiline max-lines),
we always stay under the +H limit. Eg if all history in a channel consists
of 15 line multiline events and we have +H 100 then we will store 90, not 105.
It's only for +H linelimit < max-lines that this matters, because there the
zero-lines consequence sucks too much ;)
This way you can limit the number of pastes going on in a channel, as
this is from everyone in that channel (like 'm') not individual (like 't').
If it is exceeded then we will simply reject the BATCH, similar to
how action d(rop) works for some other subtypes. You won't see the paste
on the channel, only the sending user receives an error (MULTILINE_PASTE_LIMIT).
Small note: a multiline BATCH of just 2 lines is not considered a paste.
We consider a multiline of 3+ lines as a paste. I think that is reasonable,
since a two-line-multiline is not that much of a paste ;).
In the default anti-flood profile (+F normal) we also set 2p per 15s,
so this means channels are by default limited to 2 pastes per 15s max.
Of course, you can override this with +f [4p]:15 or whatever you like.
In terms of +F profiles, the defaults are (maximum x pastes per 15 seconds):
very-strict: 1p
strict: 1p
normal: 2p
relaxed: 2p
very-relaxed: 3p
and 7 for unknown-users (with max-bytes 5250 and 1500 respectively). This
allows pasting a short snippet of code, config file, text from a site, etc.
With multiline you have the guarantee that:
1) You will see the entire text with no delay between lines
2) You won't see another persons chat half-way through such a paste
3) For multiline supporting clients it is now clear that all the text
belongs to each other, which can make selecting/copying it easier.
This basically means short snippets/pastes like that can be completely on
IRC again. No need for a pastebin for it. Though, you may still need such
a service if you are pasting more lines.
Regarding the implementation in UnrealIRCd:
* Clients without multiline get individual fallback lines (concat lines
merged, blank lines skipped, as per spec). And we know that clients like
weechat - which does support multiline - also shows all lines and not
only a few plus snippet style "[.."]. That is another reason for only
allowing 15 lines by default and not something much more. Otherwise all
those clients would get a big wall of text, which just sucks.
* Spamfilter (also) runs on the full text of all lines together, so
splitting a phrase across lines does not evade spamfilter.
* Fakelag: a client can send the BATCH start+PRIVMSG (or NOTICE)+BATCH end
at full speed. We impose no fake lag there. Also, the multiline default
max-lines and max-bytes are lower than the example class::recvq of 8000,
so should be perfectly safe. If the entire BATCH is accepted then we
will impose fake-lag afterwards, with a cap of 15 seconds maximum.
If the BATCH is rejected, we impose half the fakelag plus 2sec.
* If the time between BATCH start and BATCH end is more than 15 seconds
then the BATCH is rejected (set::multiline::batch-timeout).
* The BATCH is atomic (either you see it all, or you see none of it):
* When the client sends it to server, it is buffered first.
* Only after the batch close the server indicates if it is accepted
or rejected. This has various reasons, two of them are: 1) The client
is going to send everything in one go anyway and not wait for a
response between each PRIVMSG, and 2) we can't do many checks in the
buffering stage and skip those after, that would cause a TOCTOU
problem (eg. a banned user still being able to speak).
* If any line gets rejected due to spamfilter or other case
(eg +c, +b ~text with block, etc etc), the entire batch is rejected
* Locally we deliver all or nothing (as said)
* S2S we buffer the batch as well, so if a server splits after having
received 10 lines out of 15, then clients will not see anything.
* We send max-lines and max-bytes, this is the hard upper limit.
* A multiline can still be limited more tight if:
* +f with 't' or 'm' restricts to fewer lines,
eg +f [5t]:15, which means max 5 lines per 15 seconds,
means the max accepted multiline is 5 for that channel.
* +F works the same, except that default +F normal does not
have a 't' at the moment and 'm' is very high (50) so
practically not limited by default.
* There will be a future +f flood subtype for some more control
TODO: we will send CAP NEW on unknown-users <-> known-users to
indicate the new max-lines value if you transition security groups
TODO: chat history does not yet include multiline batches.
Bram Matthys